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1"PREEMPTIVE WAR": IS IT CONSTITUTIONAL?
On March 19, 2003, at 2200 hours (EST), the United States launched a 
full-scale military attack against the sovereign state of Iraq. Iraq had neither 
attacked the United States, nor was it in the final stages of preparing for such an 
assault. Thus, for the first time in the 214-year history of our country, America 
had begun a Preemptive War.1
As early as May 2002, President Bush spoke about the use of 
"preemption" in a speech he gave at West Point on combating terrorism.2
Subsequently, the administration continued to maintain the position that Iraqi’s 
leadership must be eliminated because the Ba’ath regime was continuing the 
development of weapons of mass destruction, and might again use those 
weapons against an opponent, or supply those weapons to terrorist networks.3
Thus, the Executive Branch claimed the power to attack a sovereign 
nation solely on the grounds of fear that that nation might do us harm in the 
future.4  Obviously, the President has felt comfortable putting this claim, unique in 
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2our nation's history, into action.  But does our Constitution anticipate such a use 
of military force by the federal government?
While there exists a significant body of literature on the respective 
allocation of war power between the President and Congress, there literally is not 
a single word written in case law or legal literature about whether or not the 
federal government (i.e., President and Congress in concert) possesses the 
power to wage preemptive war under our Constitution.
In this essay, I argue that the courts should find that the federal 
government lacks such a power.  Others may disagree.  That is fine; it is my 
intention to provoke response.  None can question, however, that this is a debate 
in which the legal academy should engage.
A. Introduction: The Significant Legal Difference Between Anticipatory 
Versus Preemptive War
The Constitution provides the federal government with a number of 
interrelated enumerated powers which, when taken together with the “Necessary 
and Proper” clause, allow use of military force in a wide range of circumstances. 
These include powers to declare war and make appropriations to support the 
war, powers to enter into treaties, powers to function as commander in chief of 
the military, the powers to conduct foreign relations, and powers to ensure that 
the laws (including international law) are “faithfully executed.” Together, these 
provide the federal government with flexibility to use force to protect our citizens 
and property, our allies, our territory, our commerce, and to use our military as a 
member of an international peacekeeping and/or humanitarian force.
plans;" Robert Collier, “Bush’s Evidence of Threat Disputed, Findings Often Ambiguous, 
3Our federal government, however, is by design a government of limited 
powers.5 As I will show, a broad survey of American political-legal self-
understanding in the realm of war fairly leads one to conclude that those powers 
should not include the right to use military force in support of “preemptive war” or 
"preemptive self-defense;”6 by which I mean "us[ing] force to quell any possibility 
of future attack by another state, even where there is no reason to believe that an 
attack is planned and where no prior attack has occurred.”7 Courts should, 
therefore, be prepared to declare a preemptive war, such as our current venture 
into Iraq, to be unconstitutional.
Let me put what I'm contending into perspective. Plainly, this nation can 
act in “anticipatory” self-defense if the threat to our country is truly imminent.8
Even before the modern world with its long range missiles and terrorists camps 
this concept was embodied in the Caroline doctrine of 1842,9 an agreement 
between British and American officials that defensive force is permitted when the 
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4”[n]ecessity of that defense is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of 
means, and no moment for deliberation.”10
Modern circumstances admittedly require a bit more flexibility than 
envisioned in the Caroline doctrine.  "Anticipatory" self-defense in the modern 
world, thus, would include attacking the Japanese fleet steaming toward Pearl 
Harbor in WWII provided we had clear and convincing evidence of their intent,11
bombing a terrorist training camp planning attacks on our citizens or soil, going 
on the offensive after suffering an initial attack and knowing that further attacks 
are coming, attacking when we know that an enemy is preparing to launch 
missiles.12
In all these circumstances, the level and certainty of the risk to be endured
before resorting to force fits well within the concept of “imminence” as that 
concept is conceived in the classic requirement for the use of deadly force in self-
defense.13 Alternatively, one could designate the tipping point as where there is a 
“clear and present danger”14 that the risk will come to fruition.  This standard,
10
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5taken from 1st Amendment doctrine involving advocacy of unlawful conduct, 
seeks to resolve the tension of granting an extremely serious use of power to the 
federal government (barring or punishing speech) in a context where the feared 
risk has not yet materialized. Likewise, in the present situation, we are 
contemplating an extremely serious use of federal power (armed military force) in 
the face of a risk that was only a possible future risk, and not a current reality.
In contrast to justifying the use of force by reference to some notion of 
"imminence" defined so as to recognize the realities of the modern world, 
Preemptive War is carried out when the situation is neither imminent in any 
meaningful sense, nor has reached the point of constituting a clear and present 
danger that the feared harm to our citizens and nation will become reality.  It is, 
thus, this later use of military force which the courts should declare as beyond 
the powers possessed by the federal government under our Constitutional 
framework, and thereby unconstitutional.
Also, for reasons I will discuss later, a claim that use of military force is 
preemptive, and, therefore, unconstitutional, does not face the obstacle which 
has consistently blocked litigation concerning use of military force; i.e., the 
Political Question Doctrine.
B. The Federal Government Was Not Given the Constitutional Power to
Conduct Preemptive Self-Defense or Preemptive War
One searches in vain to locate a specific case or textual discussion of the 
issue of preemptive war and federal power. In contrast, literature abounds with 
debates about whether the President unilaterally may engage in war, or whether 
6it is Congress which must declare war,15 with the President left only with the 
power necessary to repel a “sudden attack.”16
On the Congressional side of this debate are those emphasizing the need 
for broad based popular discussion and support of the war given the human and 
economic burdens war brings to its citizens, and the fact that the Constitution 
states that Congress is the branch to “Declare War.”17 On the executive side of 
this debate are those looking at the law of war as it existed in England prior to the 
Revolution,18 and to the fact that over 100 times in our history the executive has 
used troops without Congressional consultation.19 In between, are those who 
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7believe  that matters involving the use of military use force are properly issues of 
negotiation between the political branches,20 or those who believe that absent 
Congressional action, the President has free reign in the military arena, but 
Congress always may constrain the Executive’s actions.21
All of this is very interesting and important, yet none of this bears on 
whether or not the federal governmentboth executive and legislative branches 
togetherpossess the power to engage in preemptive war under our 
Constitution. Those few cases reaching the merits of any issue in which the 
existence of a state of war is relevant are similarly of no use in this inquiry. They 
do not deal with the combined power of the political branches of government to 
use military force; rather, they involve statutory and admiralty law regarding 
taking and/or selling “prize” ships and their goods.22
The lack of direct textual or case material, however, does not deny a court 
the ability to decide this issue. Under our law, circumstantial evidence has equal 
force to that which is direct. The weight of circumstantial evidence provides 
legitimacy to a claim that the federal government does not have the power under 
our Constitution to commit military force to Preemptive War. The circumstantial 
evidence falls into five categories: (1) the philosophical underpinnings of our 
Constitution’s legitimacy; i.e., John Locke’s Social Contract Theory; (2) the 
Founder’s and the “Just War” Doctrine; (3) the Founder’s perspective on War; (4) 
20
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8the possible permanent effect on the constitutional structure; and (5) the 214 
year’s experience of our nation in employing military force.
1. Preemptive War or Preemptive Self-Defense is at Odds with the 
Rationale Underlying the Social Contract Theory Upon which the 
Legitimacy of our Government Rests
“We the people, in order to form a more perfect union . . .” is a direct 
expression of the political theory provided in the Social Contract of John Locke.23
While the social contract theory had appeared in writings on political philosophy 
for over a hundred years before the formation of this nation, only America took to 
heart Locke’s theory to actually structure the government of a new nation.24
The social contract theory postulated that back in the mists of time man 
lived in a state of nature where it was “all against all.” In this world, each 
individual had “natural rights” revealed by their God-given reason. But each man 
was his own law with respect to asserting and protecting these rights, with force 
being the final arbiter. In other words, man possessed a great deal of freedom, 
but not much security.
To gain security for their lives and property, people were willing to leave 
the state of nature, and with it, their previously unappealable right to be the 
22 Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 1 (1801); Little v. 
Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 170 (1804); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
23
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1980).
24
 Doernberg, "‘We The People’: John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, And Standing to 
Challenge Government Action,” 73 CAL. L. REV. 52-68 (1985); Gardner, “Consent, Legitimacy and 
elections: Implementing Popular Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution,” 52 PITT. L. REV.
189 (1990). In fairness, it should be noted that some of the Founders espoused the addition of 
the philosophy of Civic Republicanism (civic virtue) to Locke’s Social Contract in order to mitigate 
what they believed was the excessive individualism of Locke’s theory. See, e.g., Thomas L. 
Pangle, "The Spirit of Modern Republicanism--The Moral Visions of the American Founders and 
the Philosophy of Locke."
9ultimate law.25 One, thus, gave up the right to make the rules for day-to-day life, 
leaving that to a representative body which itself was subject to law. All disputes
then were ultimately decided by the law, not by individual will. 
Again, these Lockean related natural law notions directly guided the 
construction of our Constitution and our form of government,26 and even played 
an explicit part in early Supreme Court decisions.27 After all, those early judges 
were there at the creation of this nation. They knew that they had embarked upon 
a great and new political experiment in government. It was a nation 
simultaneously “of the people, by the people, and for the people.” Time has made 
us forget this, or at least caused us to think of only the trees of the constitutional 
text and not the underlying forest of political philosophy. Yet the theory of social 
contract lies at the very basis of the legitimacy of our government. Our 
government was not based on conquest or the Divine Right of Kings. Its 
legitimacy was based on the belief (treated as fact) that the citizenry had entered 
into a contract.
Each citizen’s security could obviously be threatened by foreign powers. 
The Constitution upholds the federal government’s side of the Lockean bargain28
by promising to “[P]rovide for the common defense.” PREAMBLE, UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION. Reviewing the philosophical roots of that bargain, however, it 
25
 See, Locke, supra, n. 23, at Editor’s Introduction.
26 See, supra, n. 24.
27 See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 (Cranch.) 87 
(1810)); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch.) 43 (1815).
28
 “Security against foreign danger” was “an avowed and essential object of the American Union.” 
THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 304 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cook ed., 1982).
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seems unlikely that the “common defense” would include any notion of 
“preemptive” defense.
After all, under the social contract theory, one trades the right to be their
own law in return for the assurance that the government will protect them from 
the ultimate risk in the state of nature: That another to whom I have threatened 
no direct harm, will nonetheless take my “property” (which for Locke includes 
both my material goods, my land, and my life). It would be anomalous if the 
Founders, who had adopted the social contract theory as the basis for their 
government’s legitimacy, would arrogate to that same government the right to do 
that very thing to other individuals and nations outside our borders; i.e., attack 
when not directly threatened. The only enemies the Founders would have 
envisioned would have been European. These also were the countries of the 
colonists' ancestry and heritage. The Founders of this fledgling nation could 
hardly have even conceptualized such old and culturally rich countries as 
England, France, and Spain as suddenly living in, and subject to the rules of, the 
state of nature.
The “common defense,” thus, would have meant common self-defense; 
defense against actual or imminent attack. Of course the Founders had an 
Ocean between themselves and their European enemies. They could never 
imagine an object that could be launched across that Ocean and land with such 
explosive force that the object could obliterate any city existing in their world. 
They never imagined structures the size of a hundred houses stacked on top of 
one another, and a flying object crashing into the structure, exploding and 
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destroying the entire edifice. But that just changes the factual understanding of 
what threat can now be “imminent”. It does not change that an “imminent” threat 
is still the standard for the constitutional exercise the power to use military force. 
2. Preemptive War or Preemptive Self-Defense Would Be Antithetical 
to the Framer’s Notion of a “Just War
The Founder’s Christian beliefs were inextricably tied into the Social 
Contract theory. The limited government conceived at the Constitutional 
Convention was in part limited because of the belief that there existed 
“inalienable rights” (such as those at the center of the Declaration of 
Independence) which could neither be ceded to nor taken by the federal 
government.29 These rights were those revealed as “Natural law,” rights30 made 
manifest through God-given reason,31 inherent in God’s creation of man.
As persons so fundamentally religious that their political philosophy and 
religious conceptions intellectually intertwined, the Founder’s view of war would 
have been circumscribed by the “Just War” Doctrine.32 The “Just War” Doctrine
provided norms and criteria for assessing whether a government’s resort to force 
was morally justified. The doctrine provided criteria both for judging whether 
resort to force was justified (ius ad bellum) and criteria regarding the conduct of 
war once combat commenced(ius in bello).33 The ius ad bellum contains six 
criteria: (1) just cause; (2) competent authority (3) right intention; (4) last resort 
29
 See, Wardle, “Reason to Ratify: The Influence of John Locke’s Religious Beliefs on the 
Creation and Adoption of the United States Constitution,” 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 291, 301.
30 Id., at 304-305; Lawrence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 560-561 (2 ed. 
1988).
31 See, Wardle, supra, n. 29, at 307-308.
32
 For a general overview of the Just War, see, “War, Morality of” THE NEW CATHOLIC 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, vol. 14, page 635, et seq. (R.A. McCormick, D. Christiansen (2d. ed. 2003). 
See also, R. Musto: THE CATHOLIC PEACE TRADITION (1988)).
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(5) probability of success; and (6) proportionality.34 It is hard to imagine how a 
truly Preemptive War could ever meet these six criteria.
Admittedly, the 20th and 21st centuries have seen conflicts break out in 
permutations different than a war begun by some aggressor nation, such as 
Germany in WWII. Adding to the type of traditional war such as the one the 
federal government has conducted against Iraq, our world is now plagued with 
guerilla warfare, terrorism and counter-terrorist campaigns, and ethnic cleansing. 
Yet none of that changes the basic Just War doctrine. “Just Cause” still means 
that the “war is permissible only to confront ‘a real national and certain 
danger'.…"35 Again, by definition that cannot encompass Preemptive War.
Not surprisingly, given this definition of “just cause”, as well as the 
requirement of “last resort,” the United Conference of Catholic Bishops in a 
“Statement on Iraq” plainly indicated that war against Iraq would not be a “Just” 
one under the Doctrine.36 In fact, in addition to the “just cause” and “last resort”
criteria, the Bishops also questioned both the criteria for “competent authority” 
(questioning our country taking such action other than as part of a UN initiative) 
and “proportionality” (citing the current suffering of the Iraqi people under the 
sanctions, and the likely further suffering in the event of war.)37
3. Preemptive War is Inconsistent with the Founders Perspective on 
War
33
 Id., at 637.
34 Ibid.
35
 "The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and our Response,” 1983 United State Bishops’ 
pastoral letter on nuclear war and deterrence.
36
 See, "Statement on Iraq,” United States of Catholic Bishops, Washington D.C., 1-2 (Nov. 13, 
2002); Bishop Wilton D. Gregory, “Letter to President Bush,” 2 (Sept. 13, 2002).
37
 Ibid. See, also, “Consequences of Future Force Against Iraq (address to President Bush and 
Secretary of State Rumsfeld), Center for Constitutional Rights (January 24, 2002) (details 
humanitarian harm of Iraqi war on Civilian population).
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The Founders had just gone through a bloody war on their soil. They had 
no interest in making the waging of war by the federal government an easy 
exercise.38 Thus, in the Pennsylvania ratifying conference, James Wilson spoke 
of the Constitution and war: "The system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated 
to guard against it."39 Wars were matters of necessity; something to be avoided if 
possible. With this perspective it is hard to imagine that the Founders would have 
given the federal government the power to make war on the grounds other than 
true “imminent” danger; i.e., traditional self-defense.
Americans did not seek empire and conquest. They had been colonies; 
they were not at heart colonialists to the extent of the European powers. They 
had gone into battle under a banner displaying a coiled rattlesnake ready to 
strike, under which was written, “Don’t tread on Me.” The implication was clear: 
Don’t bother us, we won’t bother you. So strong was this inclination in fact that 
during the War of 1812 there were serious questions within the federal 
government whether it had the power to cross the border into Canada as part of 
its nation’s defense.40
38
 See, Bickel, “Congress, the President, and the power to Wage War,” 48 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV.
131, 132-133 (1971) (Founders wanted to make it difficult to engage in real war). While 
Professors Ely and Yoo, supra, n. 15, hold diametrically opposed views on the locus of power to 
initiate war under our Constitution (Ely placing it in the Congress; Yoo in the President), both 
agree that one purpose of their chosen structure was to make the initiation of war difficult. Ely is 
concerned with a war initiated without the type of widespread political debate and support 
engendered by the legislative process. Yoo cites concerns of the Founders that, “Classical history 
displayed wild tendencies by pure democracies toward war” and that the popular will might be 
“consumed with private interests” in seeking war. Placing substantial control over the war power 
by the executive, Yoo, contends, lessened those concerns. See, Yoo, “Continuation of Politics,” 
supra, n. 15, at 302.
39
 Yoo, “Continuation of Politics,” supra, n. 15, at 190.
40 Abraham D. Sofer, War, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWERSTHE 
ORIGINS, 268 (1976).
14
As constitutional convention delegate Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut said, 
“there is material difference between making war and making peace. It shd. [sic.] 
be easier to get out of war than it is to get into it.” Supporting Ellsworth, George 
Mason of Virginia added that he “was for clogging rather than facilitating war; but
for facilitating peace.41
Moreover, a significant percentage of the citizenry at that time would not 
have wanted to give the federal government any more excuse to raise an army 
than necessary. The greatest fear of the Anti-federalist regarding war powers 
was that the President, in alliance with or at least unopposed by Congress, would 
use a standing army to create a federal dictatorship.42 Allowing preemptive war 
would have given the executive a rationale for constantly maintaining an army. 
The new American citizens had just fought and died to expel just such a 
government in the form of the Crown and its troops. They were not about to fall 
under the heels of the same form of government, with the title “President” 
substituted for “King."
41
 Yoo, “Continuation of Politics,” supra, n. 15, at 263. In fact, the new nation possessed neither 
economic nor military resources to wage war (at the time Washington assumed the presidency, 
there were fewer than 840 men in the U.S. Army, and there were no naval forces to command).  
See, Jules Lobel, "Foreign Affairs and the Constitution: The Transformation of the Original 
Understanding," in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 274-75 (1990) (revised ed.). 
As Attorney General Randolph wrote to James Monroe in 1775:
Foreign policy was a major concern underlying the convocation of the 
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. Various state governments were 
violating international law and treaty agreements, provoking retaliatory actions by 
European powers. Randolph opened the main business of the convention by 
listing the defects of the Articles of Confederation, the first of which included 'that 
they could not cause infractions to treaties or of the law of nations to be 
punished.' Madison echoed this theme, asking whether the proposed 
constitutional plan will 'prevent those violations of the law of nations and treaties 
which if not prevented must involve us in the calamities of war.'
Letter From Randolph to James Monroe (June 1, 1795) cited in Lobel, "The Rise and Decline of 
the Neutrality Act: Sovereignty and Congressional War Powers in United States Foreign Policy," 
24 HARV. INT'L LAW J. 1, 21 (1983); see, also, F. Wharton, A Digest of International Law of the 
United States, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1887), 3: 514.
15
4. Permitting Preemptive War Risks Permanent Alteration of the Basic 
Constitutional Structure
The federal government faces the limits of its powers when its actions 
threaten a permanent alteration of the basic constitutional structure. Thus, recent 
Tenth Amendment Supreme Court jurisprudence retains sensitivity to the 
concern that excessive federal encroachment into matters affecting the states 
risks erosion of state sovereignty, and with it, the basic federalist constitutional 
structure. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States.43 Underlying this stance is a more 
general notion, a notion embedded in logic. You cannot legitimately exercise a 
power given with the purpose of supporting an entity when that power is being 
employed in a manner which destroys that very entity.
The same concern inures in the misuse of federal military power. At the 
extreme, the federal government hardly could constitutionally use its power to 
use military force if that force was employed to seize control of all state 
governments when there was no insurrection. While permitting preemptory war 
does not raise this extreme scenario, it carries the risk of a serious undermining 
of the constitutional structure, and it is a risk to our federal republic that is far 
greater than that posed by any foreseeable misuse of the Commerce Clause.
For this harm to our constitutional structure to emerge would only require
something like the following scenario: Claiming the right to conduct preemptive 
war, the federal government carries out a series of seemingly unending military 
42
 Id., at 272-273.
43
 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (congressional act barring possession of firearms in "school zones" 
beyond power of Congress). See, also, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Violence 
Against Women Act beyond congressional power under Commerce Clause).
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actions: from Afghanistan to Iraq; Iraq to Syria; Syria to Iran; Iran to Somalia; 
Somalia to North Korea; North Korea to [fill in the blank]. Once preemptive self-
defense is accepted as legitimate, what may have previously been unthinkable, 
now becomes relatively simple (especially with a compliant visual media which 
seems to find "war as a sporting event," or "war as a video game," good for 
ratings.)
How can this be? Again, it's simple. Relying upon the rationale of 
preemptive self-defense, particularly when conjoined with the recent belief in 
state sponsored terrorism, our country can justify attacking any other nation. In 
this post-9/11 world, it is litany that a handful of terrorists armed with so-called 
weapons of mass destruction could cause significant harm and inflict large-scale 
casualties on an otherwise powerful country. Therefore, e.g., employing the 
preemptive defense rationale, Russia could justify attacking Monaco on the claim 
that a group of croupiers at the casino had planned to provide a few vials of 
some deadly virus to the Chechnyan rebels.
So, now imagine our scenario has proceeded to where our country is 
embroiled in a series of wars. In this constant state of war, our society's almost 
exclusive focus becomes the current war. Federal funds and priorities become 
focused on all things military. But, because any attack on a nation in the twenty-
first century carries the threat of terrorist reprisals, states must be enlisted in anti-
terrorism security. This, however, will tend to drain state coffers, leaving 
insufficient funding for such traditional state functions as education and crime 
control. At the same time, the constant danger of enemy attack can be used to 
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justify broad security-directed legislation like the Patriot Act, increased pressure 
on civil liberties,44 and an ever mounting presence of the federal government in 
our private lives. The result is a dominating federal government in which the 
states and the citizens principally exist to endlessly support the federal military-
industrial complex, preemptive war to preemptive war. Under these 
circumstances, the federalist conception reflected in the constitutional structure 
of our government would exist only in the most diluted form, as that structure 
undergoes de facto alteration.
5. In the Two-Hundred and Fourteen Year History of this Nation, Prior 
to Our Attack on Iraq, There Was Not a Single Instance When We 
Engaged in Preemptive War
The United States has sent troops into other sovereign nations well over 
100 times.45 Admittedly, history suggests that some of the official rationales were 
perhaps ingenuous, with the military action at least in part being motivated by, 
e.g., a desire to annex land on the North American continent.46 Yet even these 
never amounted to anything akin to preemptive self-defense:
44
 Recent experience has unfortunately made this risk palpable. See, e.g., Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights, "Imbalance of Powers: How Changes to U.S. Law and Policy Since 9/11 Erode 
Human Rights & Civil Liberties" (2003) (six month update of original report) (publication details: 
widespread post-9/11 enhancement of governmental powers to spy on U.S. citizens and to gather 
information about U.S. citizens; legislation limiting citizens' access to information about the 
federal government; indefinite incarceration of U.S. citizens; expanded power to search libraries, 
bookstores, and the internet; proposals that would permit extradition of U.S. citizens for trial in 
foreign countries with which we have no extradition treaties; proposals that would permit loss of 
U.S. citizenship as punishment for certain acts; and lessening constraints on foreign intelligence 
services to conduct domestic surveillance).
45
 See, supra, n. 19.
46
 Both the incursions into Spanish–controlled Florida in the early 1800s and the Mexican War in 
1846 smack of the aggrandizement of territory. Yet neither was based on any claim of a right to 
conduct a Preemptive War. Florida combined instability in a territory we were in the process of 
negotiating to purchase, the request of a revolutionary government for our aid, and the reality that 
British troops would be stationed at the Southern border of the new nation, filling the vacuum 
resulting from the collapse of the Spanish Empire. See, Sofaer, supra, n. 40, at 294-326. The 
Mexican War involved our claim of a lawful right to disputed territory, which now constitutes much 
of Texas. President Polk sent troops to claim all land north of the Rio Grande. When the Mexican 
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The historical record indicates that the United States has 
never, to date, engaged in a ‘preemptive’ military attack against 
another nation.47
Throughout our over 200 year history as a nation, use of force has been 
grounded in a variety of rationales. Some have involved the use of force to 
protect U.S. citizens and property.48 Some involved circumstances where the 
local governments allegedly could no longer maintain order,49 including some 
where treaty rights50 supplemented this nation’s right to intervene. We have even 
employed troops in a failed attempt to rescue American citizens held hostage. 51
Some incursions were based on the Monroe Doctrine; sending troops to 
states in our hemisphere whose instability made them incapable of keeping 
“foreign powers” out of the Western Hemisphere. 52 Force has also been used to 
government understandably objected and crossed the Rio Grande, America considered itself 
"attacked on its soil,” and, thus, responded in self-defense of its territory and people. See, 
Grimmett, supra, n. 1, at CRS-1; Ratner, supra, n. 15, at 468; note, "Future Combat," supra, n. 
15, at 1780.
47
 See, Grimmett, supra, n. 1, at CRS-1 to CRS-2.
48
 Troops have been deployed to protect citizens in Haiti (intermittently: 1915-1934); Dominican 
Republic (intermittently: 1916-1924; 1965); the Boxer Rebellion(1900) (though in the process 
were violated international law by taking reprisals against the rebel. See, O’Connell, supra, n. 2, 
at 6) Nicaragua (1912); Panama (1903, 1989); Grenada (1983) (also at request of neighboring 
islands when a Marxist faction overthrew the existing government); (Formosa 1955); Lebanon 





 Intrusions into Haiti and the Dominican Republic in the early portion of the 20th century were in 
part justified by treaties which in effect made those nations U.S. protectorates. Treaties involving 
Panama and the Canal were used as part of the justification for our intervention in 1903. 
Similarly, President Eisenhower’s decision to send marines to the Dominican Republic in 1965 
was based on O.A.S. obligations. See, Grimmett, supra, n. 1, at CRS-2 TO CRS-3; Note, “Future 
Combat”, supra, n. 15, at 1792-1793.
51
 See Yoo, “Continuation of Politics,” supra, n. 15, at 8 (troops sent in unsuccessful attempt to 
rescue Iranian hostages in 1980).
52
 See, Sofaer, supra, n.40,  at 255; Grimmett, supra, n.1,  at CRS-2 to CRS-3.
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respond to a foreign state which sponsored terrorism that resulted in the death of 
American citizens in Europe. 53
Military force has been employed to restore governments to power in our 
own hemisphere,54 and at other times has been used in conjunction with a treaty 
obligation to ensure the “neutrality” of the Isthmus of Panama.55 We have also 
used our troops to preserve the status quo while negotiating for the annex of 
foreign held territory on our continent,56 and have dispatched troops to pursue 
pirates, bandits, and outlaws.57
We have protected our military personnel, such as in the Pueblo58 and 
Marquez59 incidents, and when our troops have been fired upon when providing 
military aid to neighboring nations.60 We have fought wars against nations who 
continued to prey on our shipping and commerce,61 against nations that invaded 
“disputed territory” we claimed to have annexed, against a nation that attacked 
our Naval bases (Pearl Harbor), against a nation intertwined with terrorists who 
attacked on our soil (9/11), and against a nation which refused to leave its 
53
 See, Henkin, supra, n. 15, at 99; Hon R. Torricelli, “War Powers Resolution After the Libya 
Crisis,” 7 PACE L. REV. 661 (1987).
54
 See, Henkin, supra, n.15, at 101 (troops to Haiti in 1994).
55
 See, Note, “Future Combat," supra, n. 15, at 1789 (intervention in Panama against Columbia in 
1903 based on 1846 treaty).
56
 See, discussion of intrusions into Spanish held Florida, supra, n. 44.
57
 We have chased Pancho Villa into Mexico, the Seminoles into Florida, and Noriega into 
Panama. See, Berger, supra, n. 15, at 59-60; Note, “Future Combat,” supra, n. 15, at 1789.
58
 See, Note, “Future Comba,t” supra, n. 15, at 1781 (military response to North Korean attack on 
U.S. Naval ship, the Pueblo.
59
 See, Yoo, “Continuation of Politics,” supra, n. 15, at 181 (military response to Cambodian 
attack on Mayaquez in 1975).
60
 Note, “War Powers Resolution,” supra, n. 19, at 1422 (troops providing military aid at request of 
El Salvador  fired upon; 1984).
61
 For example, war against the Tripoli Pirates (1802) and Algiers (1815); Undeclared war against 
France (“Adam’s War, 1798-1800); War of 1812; WWI (1914). See, Ratner, supra, n. 15, at 465-
466; Note, “Future Combat,” supra, n. 15, at 1785-1786.
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Caribbean colony, declared war against us, and arguably sank one of our battle 
ships. (“Remember the Maine”).62
Most of our use of force in the latter 20th Century, however, has been 
pursuant to some combination of regional and bilateral defense pacts (NATO, 
SEATO), treaty obligations, and UN membership.63 In addition to justifying force 
against aggressors, these commitments also have provided the basis for 
providing troops for peacekeeping and humanitarian purposes.64
Only the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)65 even hinted at the use of 
preemptive force. Yet that incident hardly stands as a precedent. In the first 
place, reasonable people could have characterized the risk to our citizens and 
soil as “imminent.” After all, our deadly enemy, the “Evil Empire”, whose leader 
had told ours that “We will bury you,” had surreptitiously brought nuclear missiles 
to an island ally of theirs, located a boat ride from our shore. Advisors from that 
“Cold War” enemy nation were helping set up and man the missile batteries and 
these missiles would soon be, if not already, pointing at us. In the second place, 
62
 The Spanish-American War is somewhat complex in its origins. We ordered Spain to leave 
Cuba; they declared war on U.S.; we declared war on them; the Maine blew up and sunk. See, 
Grimmett, supra, n 1, at CRS-2; Ratner, supra, n 15, at 470.
63
 The Korean War (1950) was justified by our commitments to the UN charter; Viet Nam was 
justified by the SEATO mutual defense pact and the 1954 Geneva Accord which divided North 
and South Korea; the 1991 Iraqi War by a UN Resolution following Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait. See, 
Office of the legal advisor, U.S. Department of State, “The legality of United States Participation 
in Viet Nam,” 75 YALE L. J. 1085 (1966); Note, “Future Combat,” supra, n. 15, at 1791-1792; 
Stramseth, ”Collective Force and Constitutional Responsibility: War Powers in the post-Cold War 
Era,” 50 MIAMI L. REV. 145 (1995). This has prompted some authors to question whether UN 
Resolutions and Treaties can supplant Congress’s role in declaring war, see, Van Alstine, 
“Congress, the President, and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem to Viet Nam,” 121 U. PAL. 
REV. 1, 15 (1972); and whether treaties can trump constitutional protections, Bishop, Jr., 
“Unconstitutional Treaties,“ 42 MINN. L. REV. 773 (1958).
64
 Ibid. Sending troops into Lebanon (1982) (secular violence continues after Israeli invasion), 
Kosovo (1984), and Somalia (1993), all were part of UN or NATO peacekeeping and 
humanitarian missions.
65
 See, Grimmett, supra, n. 1, at CRS-2; Yoo, “Applying the War powers Resolution To the War 
on Terrorism,” 6 GREEN BAG 2D 175, 179 (2003).
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and most importantly, we did not attack Cuba. The combination of a naval 
blockade and tense negotiations led to removal of the missiles.
It is far more than mere coincidence that in 214 years our nation has never 
even attempted to resort to rationalizing our use of force under the label of 
“Preemptive” defense. It is far more than mere coincidence that such a rationale 
arguably would violate International Law.66 Rather, any notion of attempting to 
legitimate the rationale of preemptive war should strike one as deeply terrifying if 
one takes but a moment to think of its implications for any possibility of a world at 
peace.
If America creates a precedent through its practice, that 
precedent will be available, like a loaded gun, for other states to 
use as well. The preemptive use of military force would establish a 
precedent that the United States has worked against since 1945. 
Preemptive self-defense would provide legal justification for 
Pakistan to attack India, for Iran to attack Iraq, for Russia to attack 
Georgia, for Azerbaijan to attack Armenia, for North Korea to attack 
South Korea, and so on. Any state that believes another regime 
poses a possible future threat—regardless of the evidence—could 
cite the United States invasion of Iraq.67
It is fair to infer that our Founders were far too bright to place us at such risk. 
C. The Issue of Whether the Constitution Denies the Federal Government the 
Power to Employ Preemptive Military Force is Justiciable
1. The Issue of the Limits of the Federal Government to Employ 
Military Force is a Legal One
In presenting a court with the issue of whether the federal government 
possesses the constitutional power to conduct preemptive war, one would be 
66
 O’Connell, supra, n. 6, at 2-3, 21. See, also, Jennie Green, Barbara Olshansky, Michael 
Ratner, AGAINST WAR WITH IRAQ: AN ANTI-WAR PRIMER, (Open Media Pamphlet Series, 
2003); Richard Falk, "Why International Law Matters: Pre-emptive War Flagrantly Contradicts the 
UN's Legal Framework," THE NATION, vol. 276, issue 9 (3/10/03). But see, rationale put forth in 
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asking that court to decide an issue square within the province of our judicial 
branch of government: Given our constitutional framework in which the federal 
government is one of limited, enumerated powers,68 is the power to use force in a 
Preemptive War one which the federal government has been given? This issue is 
no different than deciding the limits of the power of the federal government to act 
under the Commerce clause when those actions interfere with the affairs of the 
States under our system of Federalism. See, e.g., Lopez v. United Sates, 
supra.69
This is the classic stuff of Marbury v. Madison:70 “It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” The political 
question doctrine of Baker v. Carr, 71 thus, has absolutely no application to this
issue.
2. The Political Question Doctrine Has No Application To This Case
Courts have tended to almost reflexively associate the political question 
doctrine with any litigation attempting to enjoin the use of military force.72 The 
arguments by now are familiar. There is a textual commitment  in the Constitution 
Jason Burke & Ed Vulliamy; “War Clouds Gather as Hawks Lay Their Plans,” OBSERVER 14 (July 
14, 2002).
67
 O’Connell, supra, n. 6, at 19 (fn. omitted).
68
 See, supra, n. 5.
69 514 U.S. 549
70 5 U.S. 1 (Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803).
71 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
72
 See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 1307, 1309 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 
936 (1973); Lowery v. Regan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987); Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 
(D.D.C 1970). But see, Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (Justices Stewart and Douglass 
dissenting from denial of certiorari in case addressing constitutionality of Viet Nam War). On the 
other hand, there have been courts which found the issue of declaring war justiciable under the 
political question doctrine, denying the case on other grounds. See, e.g., Oralndo v. Larid, 434 
F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1971) (court finds evidence of “sufficient action” by Congress to 
authorize the war); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1150-1151 (D.D.C. 1990) (case asking 
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to the two political branches of government;73 it is for Congress and the executive 
to negotiate how they will handle events of military force or war, and the Court 
should not interfere;74 the relationship between war, and foreign affairs, and 
political negotiations are complex, nuanced and beyond the understanding of the 
judiciary whose uninformed interference could jeopardized national interests;75
courts lack the competence, information gathering capacity, or meaningful 
standards to assess such basically political issues76 (such as whether the 
President’s dispatch of troops constitutes “hostilities” under the War Powers 
Resolution);77 Congress can resort to "self-help" to check Presidential powers;78
the Founders considered disputes between the President and Congress as not 
constituting “cases” or “controversies”.79
court to find 1991 Iraqi war unconstitutional because Congress did not declare war; justiciable 
under political question doctrine, but not “ripe”).
73
 See, Broughton, supra, n. 20, at 691 Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715, 729 (ED NY 1970).
74
 See, Broughton, supra, n. 20, at 691.
75
 See, Orlando v. Laird, supra, 434 F.2d 1043 (It [inappropriate judicial inquiry] would indeed, 
destroy the flexibility of action which the executive and legislative must have in dealing with other 
sovereigns).
76
 See, Broughton, supra, n. 20, at 691.
77 See, Crockett v. Regan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898-899 (D.D.C. 1982). See, also, Ratner, supra, n. 
15, at 482.
78
 See, Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 25 (D.C, Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 815 (2000) 
(Silberman J, concurring). Justice Silberman also wrote that there exist no principled judicial 
standards for defining “war” for purposes of constitutional interpretation. Id., at 24-25. Even if 
Justice Silberman is correct (and his fellow jurist Tate disagreed with him, Id., at 40), that would 
have no bearing on the present case. Whatever label one puts on the proposed use of 
preemptive military force against Iraq, that particular use of force is constitutionally beyond the 
power possessed by the federal government.
79
 See, Yoo, “Continuation of Politics,” supra, n. 15, at 288 (Founders did consider disputes 
between legislative and executive branches “cases or controversies”). But see, Dellum v. Bush,
supra, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (court in principle willing to consider dispute between Congress and 
President, but case not ripe.). In present case, the dispute is between a private citizen and the 
federal government.
24
While some have forcefully argued that issues involving commitment of 
U.S. troops can and in fact must be considered by the courts,80 we need not 
consider these arguments here. For in this case, none of the rationales for which
courts have employed the political question doctrine to abstain from deciding the 
merits of questions concerning war have any applications whatsoever.
It does not matter whether the President or Congress has initiated this 
action,81 or the meaning of “Declare” war in the Constitution82 or whether the war 
can take place without such a declaration,83 or if there has been “sufficient” 
evidence of Congressional involvement with the President in the decision,84 or 
the significance of the War Powers Act and whether “hostilities” have taken place 
so as to trigger the Act,85 or if Congress has alternative means of “self-help” 
within their own legislative province and therefore do not need to involve the 
Judicial power.86 The position I'm putting forth posits that federal government 
does not have the power to wage Preemptive War, even if both political branches 
agree and Congress files a Declaration of War.
80
 See, Doe v. Bush, (U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit: #03-1266). BRIEF SUBMITTED 
ON BEHALF OF 74 CONCERNED LAW PROFESSORS AS AMICUS CURIAE  SUPPORTING 
THE REQUEST OF APPELLANTS FOR REVERAL, at 15-21 [hereinafter “Brief”]. See, also, 
Thomas M. Franck, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW 
APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992) (author posits that Court should apply same 
constitutional analysis in foreign affairs that it applies to domestic concerns).
81






 See, Campbell v. Clinton, supra, 203 F.3d, at 25. Note, that it also does not matter whether 
Congress delegated the power to attack Iraq in the “October Resolution,” H.J. Res. 114 (107th 
Cong, 2d Sess, 2001), and if they did, whether that delegation would be constitutional, “Brief,” 
supra, n. 80, at 13-16. Congress can not delegate a power which the federal government does 
not possess.
85
 See, Orlando v. Laird, supra, 443 F.2d 1042.
86
 See, Broughton, supra, n. 20, at 717.
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Likewise, traditional political questions arguments concerning the textual 
commitment of war to the political branches, the theory that structurally the 
Founders intended the Legislative and the Executive branches to provide 
systematic checks on the power of war (the Congress through controlling funding 
and impeachment; the President through use of veto power),87 the notion that 
Congress and the President must be left free to negotiate over their relative roles 
in war, and the idea that courts have no competency to interfere with this most 
extreme tool of foreign relations and diplomacy similarly have no purchase here. 
There is no interest in helping the federal government pursue a power under the 
circumstances when the court determines that the federal government does not 
possess such a power. This then, is the very type of decision for which the 
judicial branch is uniquely competent; determining when the federal government 
has acted beyond its limited powers.88
87
 See, Yoo, "Continuation of Politics," supra, n. 15, at 3.
88
 In the Iraqi situation, there was no question that the war was preemptive; but what if the matter 
was in dispute, with litigants claiming the use of force preemptive, and the government 
characterizing the use of force as anticipatory?
Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827), superficially appears to speak to these issues. In 
that case, the Court refused to question the judgment of the President whether "sufficient danger 
of invasion" existed to justify calling up the militia under a federal statute. The decision makes 
complete sense. The President must be able to respond quickly to the threat of invasion; and the 
Judiciary is in a poor position to second-guess him on the question of just assembling troops. But, 
in Mott, the Court was asked to decide whether the threat of invasion was in fact imminent. That, 
however, is a judgment for the Commander-in-Chief and the military. It is to the executive that the 
Constitution has committed the prosecution of war, and it is the President and military hierarchy 
that, as a practical matter, possess the requisite information and expertise to make that 
determination. The Court lacks this competence.
   Here, however, the present issue and Mott part company. As a power granted under statute, 
the Mott Court found that the predicate factual findings made by the President to exercise that 
power were beyond review. Id., at 30. But here we have an issue involving the very existence of a 
constitutional power. Whether the federal government's actions in committing troops falls on the 
constitutional or unconstitutional side of the line cannot be left to the ipse dixit of that same 
government.
   What then is the Court to decide? This and only this: whether, based on the evidence the 
government provides (and not just their say-so), the Court finds that a "reasonable person" could
find imminence and/or clear and present danger. In other words, the Court must find something 
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D. Conclusion
A review of the philosophy underlying the Constitution, the "just war" 
doctrine, the Founders' view on the role of war, the possible permanent effect on 
the constitutional structure, and the 214-year experience in using military force, 
make plain that the employment of Preemptive Self-Defense or Preemptive War 
are beyond the power given the federal government. We have, nevertheless, 
attacked Iraq and, with that action, lost another piece of what (if any) is left of our 
national innocence. Yet, use of military force against Iraq, which I have 
contended should be viewed as unconstitutional, must not now be seen as a 
legal precedent, next used to justify some similar incursions into Iran, North 
Korea, or who knows where else.  Next time the courts should act in this 
completely justiciable arena; next time they should define the Constitutional limits 
of the federal power to employ military force.
akin to the "reasonable fact finder" standard of FRE 104(b); i.e., sufficient evidence that a 
reasonable fact finder "could" find the factual proposition in issue. That is a legal decision, not a 
political one.
